While impossible differential attack is one of the most well-known and familiar techniques for symmetric-key cryptanalysts, its subtlety and complicacy make the construction and verification of such attacks difficult and error-prone. We introduce a new set of notations for impossible differential analysis. These notations lead to unified formulas for estimation of data complexities of ordinary impossible differential attacks and attacks employing multiple impossible differentials. We also identify an interesting point from the new formulas: in most cases, the data complexity is only related to the form of the underlying distinguisher and has nothing to do with how the differences at the beginning and the end of the distinguisher propagate in the outer rounds. We check the formulas with some examples, and the results are all matching. Since the estimation of the time complexity is flawed in some situations, in this work, we show under which condition the formula is valid and give a simple time complexity estimation for impossible differential attack which is always achievable.
Introduction
Impossible differential attack, introduced by Knudsen [1] and Biham et al. [2] independently, is one of the most well-known cryptanalytic techniques for symmetric-key cryptanalysts [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . Generally, in impossible differential cryptanalysis, we guess some key bits involved in the outer rounds of the target cipher. Then the guess is rejected if it leads to impossible differentials at the inner rounds. Despite its extensive application in symmetric-key cryptanalysis, errors in the analysis are often discovered and many papers in the literature presented subtle flaws. Note that the flaws typically arise in the estimation of the time and data complexities rather than in the distinguisher, similar to searching differential and linear characteristic [10] [11] [12] [13] , the methodology of searching for impossible differential is fairly mature, and automatic tools are available [14] [15] [16] [17] . To relieve the difficulty of the complexity analysis, Boura et al. presented generic complexity analysis formulas along with the development of new ideas for optimizing impossible differential cryptanalysis [18] . However, at FSE 2016, Derbez identified some flaws in the formulas for the time complexity estimation given in [18] , and concrete examples were presented such that the time complexities estimated with the formulas given in [19] are not achievable.
Our contribution follows Boura, Naya-Plasencia, Suder, and Derbez's work at ASIACRYPT 2014, FSE 2016, and ESC 2017; we investigate further some aspects of the estimation of the impossible differential attack which have not been explored or stated explicitly in previous work.
Firstly, we introduce a new set of notations for impossible differential analysis. With these notations, there is no difference between ordinary impossible differentials and multiple impossible differentials. Under some reasonable assumptions (the same assumptions were made implicitly in [18, 19] ), we modify the formula in [18] for calculating the data complexity into a form getting rid of the parameters of the number of bit-conditions (the in and out notations in [18] ) that have to be verified to follow some specified behavior in the outer rounds of a target cipher. Moreover, in the formulas derived with the new notations, we identify 2 Security and Communication Networks a very interesting and somehow strange point: in most cases, the data complexity is only related to the form of the underlying distinguisher and has nothing to do with how the differences at the beginning and the end of the distinguisher propagate in the outer rounds. That is, in most cases, the data complexity can be completely determined by the underlying impossible differential distinguisher employed in the attack. Hence, estimating the data complexity with the new formulas is much more easier and straightforward than that of [18] .
Secondly, since Derbez showed concrete examples where Boura et al. 's formula of the time complexity of impossible differential attack is invalid, we are interested in the condition under which the estimation of Boura et al. is correct, and we prove that the time complexity of the key-sieving process given by Boura et al. is not only achievable but also optimal if the key bits involved in the outer rounds are independent. Using the early abort technique presented by Lu et al. in [20, 21] , we give the optimal result with detailed process.
Finally, we give a formula to estimate the time complexity of the key-sieving process in the case where the key bits involved in the outer rounds are not independent. The estimation is not guaranteed to be equal to the complexity of the optimal attack as discussed by Derbez in [19] , but it is always achievable. Therefore, the formula serves to give a rough estimation of an impossible differential attack without diving into complicated calculations and time-consuming search algorithms, which should be very useful in fast prototyping in cryptanalysis.
We present a new set of notations for impossible differential analysis in Section 2. Section 3 briefly shows impossible differential attacks. In Section 4, we modify the data formula, which is related to a few parameters and unifies multiple impossible differential attacks with ordinary impossible differential attacks. In Section 5 we prove that the formula of the time complexity is achievable and optimal with the key bits independent and give a rough estimation formula for the key bits without independence. At last we conclude the paper in Section 6.
Notations
Let F 2 = {0, 1} be the finite field of two elements. For a set , its number of elements is denoted by | |, and let ‖ ‖ = log 2 (| |). Also, for an integer , let ‖ ‖ = log 2 ( ).
In addition, we use some notations like regular expression to represent a set of bit strings. For example, 1 is equivalent to the set {1}, 0 is equivalent to {0}, and 0001 is equivalent to {000001, 000011, 000101, 000111}, which is alternatively denoted by 0 3 * 2 1, where the subscript tells the number of occurrences of the symbol concerned. Definition 1. Let E (⋅) be a block cipher and , ∈ F 2 ; if ∀ , ( ⊕ ) ⊕ E ( ) ̸ = for all ∈ F 2 , we call ( , ) an impossible differential of E, which is denoted by . More generally, let A, B ⊆ F 2 ; we call (A, B) an impossible differential, denoted by A B, if for any ∈ A, ∃ ∈ B, such that , and for any ∈ B, ∃ ∈ A, such that . Note that this notation is different from the notation of impossible differential we typically see in the literature, since in our notation, it is possible that ∃ ∈ A and ∃ ∈ B, such that → is not an impossible differential.
Let ID (A, B) = {( , ) : , ∈ A, ∈ B}, where ID is simply written as ID if is clear from the context. Then we have ‖ID(A, B)‖ ≤ ‖A‖ + ‖B‖, and ‖ID(A, B)‖ = ‖A‖ + ‖B‖ in the special case for any ∈ A and ∈ B,
. It is worth mentioning, with the new notation, that we can unify ordinary impossible differentials and multiple impossible differentials in impossible differential cryptanalysis.
For example, if 0011 0001, 0011 0010, and 0011 → 0011, with the new notation, we call (0011, 00 * * ) an impossible differential, and ‖ID(0011, 00 * * )‖ = log 2 (2) = 1.
Definition 2. Let A ⊆ F 2 , and the structure (A) derived from A is defined to be the set of all -bit strings = 0 ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ −1 such that ≡ 0 for all ∈ { : ∀ ∈ A, = 0}. Given a bit string ∈ F 2 , (A) is defined to be the set + (A) = { ⊕ : ∈ (A)}. (1) and 0100 (A) = {0100, 0101, 0110, 0111, 1100, 1101, 1110, 1111}. Recall that, in differential type of cryptanalysis, if we want to get many pairs of data whose differences are in a set A, we typically first prepare a structure (A) from which the needed pairs will be generated. From Figure 1 , we can see the relationship in A, A, and (A).
Impossible Differential Attack
In contrast to ordinary differential attack which relies on differentials with high probability, impossible differential attack reduces the key space by identifying wrong key guesses with the aid of differentials which never occur.
We show how to convert an impossible differential distinguisher into a key-recovery attack in Figure 2 . Firstly, we need to append some outer rounds ( 1 with in rounds and and B to both directions in the outer rounds to get A and B, where A is the set of all differences having the possibility of creating an intermediate difference in A at the beginning of 2 , and B is defined similarly. For fixed outer rounds, A and B are not dependent on the involved secret key bits in the outer rounds. Actually they can be computed by propagating the difference patterns upwards and downwards according to the differential distribution table of the components of the cipher. Now we can identify the involved secret key bits in the outer rounds. These key bits are the secret information we are going to recover in the attack, which we call the targeted key bits. Finally, we prepare some structures (A) and encrypt the plaintexts in (A) to get the corresponding ciphertexts. For each pair ( , ) of plaintexts in (A) satisfying ⊕ ∈ A, guess the secret key information in ∪ out involved in the outer rounds. If the partial encryption/decryption of ( , ) and ( ( ), ( )) leads to impossible differentials, the guess is certainly incorrect. With this strategy, hopefully we can reject lots of wrong guesses of in ∪ out , and the key space is therefore reduced. To calculate complexity of the attack, we define in which is the number of bit-conditions that have to be verified to obtain A from A. In other words, the differences A are propagated from A with probability 1 while the differential A ← A is verified with probability 1/2 in . Similarly, we can get the definition of out .
On the Data Complexity of Impossible Differential Attack
Assuming that we have identified an impossible differential A B, we propagate A and B differentials to both directions to get A and B. Then we prepare many structures (A) by varying ∈ F 2 . For each structure (A), there are 2
pairs of plaintexts ( , ) satisfying ⊕ ∈ (A). Filtering the pairs by the condition that the differences of ciphertexts pairs are in (B), we can get approximately
Moreover, there are approximately
pairs satisfying ⊕ ∈ A and ( ) ⊕ ( ) ∈ B. According to the definitions of A and B, only (A, B)-effective pairs have the potential to suggest wrong key guesses, since it is only possible for such pairs to lead to the impossible differential A B under wrong key guesses. From the above discussion, we have the following fact. For an (A, B)-effective pair ( , ), the probability that Fact 5. The probability that an (A, B)-effective pair ( , ) leads to an impossible differential ( , ) ∈ ID(A, B) after partial encryption/decryption with a random key guess is
that is, there are ID = ‖A‖ + ‖B‖ − ‖ID(A, B)‖ bit-conditions that need to be verified for an (A, B)-effective pair to satisfy an impossible differential in ID(A, B).
Note that ID = ‖A‖ − ‖A‖ + ‖B‖ − ‖B‖ is coincidence to the notation of in + out presented in [18] for any ∈ A and ∈ B,
. Hence, the notion of in + out is actually a special case of our notion ID . This is demonstrated by the following two concrete examples.
Example 6 (on the bit-conditions). Take the impossible differential attacks on SIMON [22] presented in Appendix A.3 in [18] as an example. The impossible differential used in the attack and the outer rounds are redrawn in Figure 3 , from which we have A = {0000000000000000 0000000000000001}, B = {0000000010000000 0000000000000000}, A = 000 * * * 0 * 01 * * * * * 0 0 * * * * * * 1 * * * * * * 0 * B = 1 * * * * * * 0 * 0 * * * * * * * 01 * * * * * 0000 * * * 0
Therefore, ID = ‖A‖ − ‖A‖ + ‖B‖ − ‖B‖ = 22 − 0 + 22 − 0 = 44, which is the same as [18] where ID is calculated as in + out = (8 + 7 + 5 + 2) + (2 + 5 + 7 + 8) = 44. As can be seen in Figure 3 ,
, where is the number of bit-conditions in th round. For an (A, B)-effective pair ( , ), we can guess the key bits involved in 1 and 3 and get 1 ( )⊕ 1 ( ) and ID(A, B) , the key guess must be incorrect and therefore can be removed from the candidate key space safely. In this case, we say that a key guess is rejected by a set P of plaintext pairs if and only if the guess is rejected by at least one pair in P. Let in ∪ out be the target key space, and let P be the set of (A, B)-effective pairs generated from the chosen plaintexts. The goal of an impossible differential attack is to reject as many as possible keys in in ∪ out such that the target key space can be reduced significantly.
According to Fact 5, the probability that a key guess for in ∪ out is rejected by a given (A, B)-effective pair ( , ) ∈ P is 2 − ID . Therefore, the probability that a guess is not rejected Therefore, the number of candidates keys in the target key space after performing the impossible differential analysis is
In the literature, we typically regard
2 ID approximately as −1 . Consequently, we need approximately
(A, B)-effective pairs to reduce the target key space by log 2 bit.
Theorem 8.
With the probability = −1 = 2 −log 2 , in other words, to reduce log 2 -bit information of the space of key candidates, the data complexity is −1 , where
Proof. We are now ready to have a careful look at the data complexity needed to reduce at least log 2 bit of information of the space of key candidates by considering two cases.
In the first case, 1 structure (A) is enough to generate
namely, ‖ (A)‖ ≥ + 1 − ‖ID(A, B)‖. Assuming that we need
plaintexts from (A), then
from which we can get
In the second case, 1 structure is not enough to produce −1 (A, B)-effective pairs, and we need 2 structures. In this case, we have
Therefore, we need 2 ⋅ 2 ‖ (A)‖ = 2 +1−‖ID(A,B)‖ plaintexts. From the above two cases, we can obtain formula (8). 
From Theorem 8, we can get Corollary 9 easily with the same method. According to Theorem 8, while ‖A‖ = ‖B‖ = 0, namely, for one bit-level impossible differential, the minimum data complexity is 2 +1 . Obviously, the amount of all data is 2 , which is less than the minimum data complexity needed for a feasible impossible differential attack. 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000010000000 0000000000000000 (2) 0000000000000000 0000000010000000 0000000010000000 0000000000000000 (3) 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 0000000010000000 0000000000000000 (4) 1000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000010000000 0000000000000000 (5) 0000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000001000000000 0000000000000000 (6) 0000000000000000 0000000010000000 0000001000000000 0000000000000000 (7) 0000000000000000 0000000100000000 0000001000000000 0000000000000000 (8) 1000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000001000000000 0000000000000000 
Corollary 10. If only using one bit-level impossible differential, which is ‖A‖ = ‖B‖ = 0, then there does not exist a successful impossible differential attack.
In our formulas, the computation of the data complexity for standard impossible differential analysis and attacks based on multiple impossible differentials are unified. Moreover, our formulas reveal some interesting facts which have not been spotted previously. Taking formula (8) , for example, in almost all papers [9, 20, [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] , it is the case that
This is very reasonable, since the cryptanalysts cannot propagate A upwards too much; otherwise (A) would contain almost all strings in F 2 , which is obviously an unpleasant situation. Therefore, in most cases, the data complexity can be computed from the distinguisher (A, B) directly and has nothing to do with how A/B propagate upwards/downwards. This formula offers an extremely simple procedure for computing the data complexity of impossible differential attack. Let us show some examples. 
we can see the detail in Table 1 . It is obvious that ‖ID(A, B)‖ = log 2 (4 × 2) = 3. Thus the data complexity is approximately 2 +1−‖ID(A,B)‖ ⋅2 = 2 32+1−3 ⋅2 1 = 2 31 to reduce 2⋅log 2 ≈ 2.88− information of the key candidates space from formula (12) . Similarly, using 8 16-round impossible differentials, to reduce the target key space by approximately log 2 bit, the data complexity is approximately 2 96+1−3 = 2 94 . These data complexities are in accordance with the results proposed in [18] .
Example 12 (multiple impossible differential attack on CLE-FIA-128). In [24] , Tsunoo et al. mounted an impossible differential attack on CLEFIA [23] by using multiple impossible differentials discovered in [29] . There are the following two 9-round impossible differentials in CLEFIA 
Only considering that there is one active byte in in and out presented in Table 2 , we will show how to use our formula to determine the data complexity of an impossible differential attack based on these differentials.
From Table 3 , we can see that
Therefore, to reduce the target key space by approximately log 2 bit, the minimal number of data complexity is approximately 2 128+1−20.58 = 2 108.42 , which matches the results presented in [18, 24] perfectly.
On the Time Complexity of Impossible Differential Attack
The time complexity of the impossible differential attack is estimated by Boura et al. with the formula
Security and Communication Networks 7 where is the amount of needed data for obtaining the pairs, 2 ‖ in ∪ out ‖ is the number of candidate keys, is the ratio of the partial encryption to the full encryption, 2 ‖ ‖ is the key candidates needed to exhaustive search, and is the full encryption. The first term is the cost of generating (A, B)-effective pairs. The second term corresponds to the cost of the key-sieving procedure. Finally, the third term is the cost of exhaustive search for the key candidates which are not removed by the key-sieving procedure. Among these three terms, the second one is the most obscure part. Next, we focus attention on the second part. So before we go further, we would like to give some comments on it. Note that the comments are never meant to be precise, but try to get some intuitive understanding.
Let Q 0 , . . . , Q −1 be (A, B)-effective plaintext pairs. We create 2 ‖ in ∪ out ‖ tuples of the form W , = (Q , ), where 0 ≤ ≤ − 1 and 0 ≤ ≤ 2 ‖ in ∪ out ‖ − 1. We arrange these tuples into rows as follows:
No matter how we perform the impossible differential attack, the partial encryption and decryption of the plaintext pairs Q with guessed key in ∪ out = will be performed inevitably for those ( , ) such that is rejected by Q . Let
Then |W * | is approximately 2 ‖ in ∪ out ‖ ( /2 in + out ). Therefore, the time complexity of the key-sieving process is at least
, which is optimal. That is, the second term of Boura et al. 's formula is in some sense a minimum estimation of the complexity of the key-sieving process.
In [19] , Derbez presented some concrete examples where there is no attack whose complexity is as low as Boura et al. 's estimation. Consequently, we want to ask the question: under which condition is Boura et al. 's estimation valid? The following shows that when the key bits are independent Boura et al. 's formula is valid and achievable. For the other case when the key bits are not independent we give a simple discussion.
When the Key Bits Are Independent
Assumption 13. In order to give a technique to achieve the optimal time complexity, there are some assumptions in the target cipher. We focus our attention on these ciphers which consist of subkey XOR, nonlinear, and linear operations. For nonlinear layer, it should be composed by S-boxes or bitwise AND. In other words, the difference values of nonlinear operation should be shown in a table with less storage and we can ignore the time complexity of creating table. Therefore, most block ciphers satisfy this assumption.
Let us assume that Δ +1 is the ( +1)th round input set and Δ is the set propagated by Δ +1 with probability 1. During the key filtering phase of impossible differential attack, includes two parts: one involved the value of difference Δ and the other part involved no difference but need to get these values. Therefore, for target ciphers satisfying our assumption
An example is depicted in Figure 5 , where
In the following, we present the early abort technique in which the time complexity will achieve the optimal result if the involved key bits are independent. Assuming that there are outer rounds, let denote the involved key bits and let denote the number of bit-conditions. Given 
For
Step 0, the time complexity is
Therefore, the complexity of the whole procedure with a given permutation is
where
. Obviously, is the ratio of the cost of partial encryption to the full encryption.
Combining (20) with the early abort technique,
Fact 14.
If the involved key bits are independent, then
From Fact 14, we know that there is a permutation such that the time complexity of the key-sieving process is approximately
which is the same as Boura's formula. Without considering the time complexity of the key schedule, if the target ciphers are under our assumption and the involved key bits are independent, we can conclude that Boura et al. 's formula is correct.
Example 15 (impossible differential attack on a toy cipher). Let us consider the toy block cipher used by Derbez in [19] as an example which is defined as follows:
where is a 128-bit block cipher and where AK, SB, SR, and MC, respectively, are the AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShriftRows, and MixColumns operations from the AES: Assume that there is an impossible differential (A, B) over where A has one active byte. As shown in Figure 6 , appending one round on the top of the distinguisher we give an impossible differential cryptanalysis. The bit-condition in is 24 and there are 32 key bits. In the case that the key bits Step 1 and Step 2 are the detailed explanation about Step 0. For (A, B)-effective pairs, the time complexity in above steps is
which is in conformity with formula (23).
When the Key Bits Are Not
Independent. The previous section shows in some sense that the estimation of Boura is not only achievable but also optimal when the key bits involved are independent.
In the following, we give a formula to estimate the complexity of the key-sieving process which is always valid regardless whether the involved key bits are independent or not 2 × 2
We show how to determine by example.
Example 16 (multiple impossible differential attack on CLE-FIA-128). From Figure 4 showing the attack on CLEFIA-128 by using multiple impossible differentials, there are 4 outer rounds. The above steps show 2 = max 0≤ ≤3 {| ( ) |} = 2 42 which is equal to 2 ‖ in ∪ out ‖− in − out ; thus 2 = 1. The key point is that in Step 2 ‖ (2) ‖ = ‖ 13 ‖ = 42 ≥ 13 = 32, it does not generate greater value than 2 ‖ in ∪ out ‖− in − out , and the time complexity of the key-sieving process is 1 × 2 ‖ in ∪ out ‖ ( /2 in + out ) . To trade-off the data complexity and the time complexity, choosing = 2.6, the time complexity is N + ( + 2 
Conclusion
Thanks to the new notations, we give a unified data complexity formula for both the ordinary impossible differential attacks and attacks based on multiple impossible differentials. This formula not only is more convenient to use, but also reveals an interesting fact that the data complexity of an impossible differential attack can be derived by the mere knowledge of the underlying impossible differential distinguisher in most cases. Moreover, we show under which condition Boura et al. 's formula is valid and give a simple time complexity estimation for impossible differential attack which is always achievable. We believe that these results make the evaluation of the impossible differential attack more straightforward and reliable.
